Look-alike domains, fake websites and fake statements in an organisation’s name.
Guide G13 · Published
For organisations in whose name someone might set up a look-alike website, an email address, a press release or an interview. First how to spot a fake, then how to reduce the risk in advance, and what to do once one has appeared. Defensive steps only.
Who this guide is for and when to use it
This guide is for companies, non-profits and media outlets that want to prepare for fakes in their name, or have already met one: a website with an almost identical address, emails from their “own” mailbox, an invented press release or interview. It is general: it contains no write-ups of particular sites, outlets or people.
You collect the evidence yourself and report to the registrar, hosting provider, platform or authorities. NAK takes no part in this: we receive no material, check no websites and take nothing down.
How to spot a fake
- An address close to the real one. According to the Ministry of Justice, the addresses of a genuine and a fraudulent site can differ by one or several characters 2. The Cyber Police advise watching for a spelling mistake or an extra dot in the link 1. This is classic typosquatting: it relies on a slip of the keyboard or the eye.
- Look-alike letters from other alphabets. Different characters can look almost identical, for example a Cyrillic and a Latin letter. The Unicode standard describes such mixed-script look-alikes as a way to spoof identifiers, but notes that confusability cannot be an exact science and that checks can flag many legitimate strings 3. So do not rely on the eye alone.
- Same look, different content. The Cyber Police warn that fake sites can have an interface identical to the real one but carry false information 1.
- A new account or page. The Cyber Police advise checking an account’s creation date and its reviews 1. This applies to pages and accounts. Domain registration data helps you find the registrar to report to (see below).
- Contacts that do not match. Scammers use small alterations to names and contact details to win trust. The FBI advises checking phone numbers, URLs and spelling 4. Compare any contact with your own list of official channels.
- A padlock is not proof. The Ministry of Justice calls plain http unreliable and https only a reason to keep checking 2.
When in doubt, do not follow the link: find the organisation’s site through a search engine or an address you know yourself 2. The Ministry also mentions the Cyber Police’s “Stop Fraud” section and the CheckMyLink service for checking sites 2; we have not tested them. Check press releases and interviews against the organisation’s official page and against the outlet’s contacts that you found yourself, not those given in the suspicious material.
How to protect your organisation in advance
- 01Register the obvious variants of your name: common misspellings, a hyphenated form, other domain zones (.ua, .com.ua, .com and so on). A .UA domain is registered through accredited registrars 13. Registration alone does not protect you: the NCSC notes that an unconfigured parked domain can be used for email spoofing and phishing 7.
- 02Set up SPF, DKIM and DMARC for email. SPF publishes the IP addresses trusted to send mail for your domain; DKIM cryptographically signs your messages; DMARC sets the policy for mail that fails both checks and produces reports 5. The NCSC advises protecting all of your domains 5, starting with a DMARC policy of “none” on all of them and refining it gradually: reports begin to arrive within 24 hours 6. Your IT administrator or mail provider does this.
- 03For domains that never send mail, the NCSC advises records that declare any mail illegitimate: an SPF record with no senders (“v=spf1 -all”), a DMARC policy of “reject”, a null MX record and an empty DKIM key 7.
- 04Publish a page of official channels: your domains, your email domain, your social accounts, and what you never ask for (for example, payments through a messenger). The FTC advises telling people in advance how an organisation will contact them 18. Link to this page from signatures and statements.
- 05Monitor. Search regularly for your name and its common misspellings in search engines and social media. Public certificate logs show which certificates were issued, when, and for which domains 9; ask your IT team whether alerts can be set for names that resemble yours. Give staff a simple, safe way to report suspicious emails, and do not punish those who slip: that produces more reports 8.
- 06Reduce what can be used to fake you: review what your website and social media reveal about staff and executives, since attackers use it to make messages convincing 8.
A configured DMARC policy stops criminals forging your domain in emails, but it does not stop a look-alike domain that they register themselves. You need both layers: email configuration and monitoring.
When one appears: evidence and reports
- 01Enter nothing and pay nothing. Tell staff and partners it is a fake, and do not share the link in open chats.
- 02Collect evidence: the full URL, screenshots with the address bar and date visible, and the time with its time zone. A registrar acts on actionable evidence; useful items are the complete URL and a screenshot showing what the phishing is aimed at 11.
- 03Find the registrar from the domain’s registration data (WHOIS) 13. A registrar must publish an abuse contact on its homepage and in WHOIS results 10. Phishing counts as DNS abuse, which a registrar must act on when it has actionable evidence 11. Keep the confirmation that your report was received 11. If there is no response, ICANN accepts complaints about the registrar through its own form 10.
- 04Contact the hosting provider. Registrars and registries act at domain level, and suspending a domain can also cut off legitimate content, so sometimes notifying the site operator or host is more appropriate 11.
- 05For .UA: the registry is Hostmaster LLC and users work through registrars 13. We have not verified the complaint or dispute procedure in the .UA zone: check the registry’s site or ask a lawyer.
- 06Platforms: for an account or channel impersonating you, YouTube has an impersonation report 16; Telegram lets you report public content or email abuse@telegram.org, and its FAQ points to @NoToScam for impersonation 17. For other platforms open the current help page: we have not verified their steps.
- 07Trademark disputes: for abusive registrations of domain names there is the UDRP, heard by approved dispute-resolution providers 12. Whether it suits your case is for a lawyer to decide.
A public statement and the police
- 01Publish a short statement on your verified channels: that a fake exists, which address is genuine (link to your page of official channels) and that people should not enter data or pay. Do not link to the fake and do not name suspected culprits.
- 02Cyber Police: the “Report a cyber incident” form is for phishing and malicious material (describe the event, attach a file up to 20 MB or an email as .eml). For other matters use cyberpolice.gov.ua/declare 14 15. Attach your evidence. Where fraud or loss is involved, report it to the police and consult a lawyer.
- 03CERT-UA: if staff have already entered credentials on the fake site or there are signs of a breach, write to incidents@cert.gov.ua or call +38 (044) 281-88-25 (Mon–Thu 8:00–17:00, Fri 8:00–15:45; at weekends and on public holidays, around the clock: +38 (044) 281-88-01) 20, and isolate the affected systems 19.
- 04Change any passwords that may have reached the criminals and review active sessions: see the guide “Protecting your accounts and digital identity”.
Limits
This is a guide, not legal advice and not a service. NAK cannot take a site down, influence a registrar or platform, investigate a case or check your domain. Ask a lawyer about trademarks, domain disputes, liability and evidence for court. Email settings depend on your provider; the NCSC guidance is British and may have aged. Platform steps change; this text was last checked on 24 Oct 2026. The sources used are listed below.
Sources
- 1Cyber Police Department, National Police of Ukraine. Phishing and fake accounts: how to protect yourself from online fraudsters · accessed 2026-10-24
- 2Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Ministry of Justice informs: how to spot a fraudulent website · accessed 2026-10-24
- 3Unicode Consortium. Unicode Technical Standard #39: Unicode Security Mechanisms (confusables) · accessed 2026-10-24
- 4FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center. Senior US officials impersonated in malicious messaging campaign (PSA I-051525) · accessed 2026-10-24
- 5UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Email security and anti-spoofing · accessed 2026-10-24
- 6UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Implement a DMARC policy of none · accessed 2026-10-24
- 7UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Protecting parked domains · accessed 2026-10-24
- 8UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). Phishing attacks: defending your organisation · accessed 2026-10-24
- 9certificate.transparency.dev. Certificate Transparency · accessed 2026-10-24
- 10ICANN. Registrar abuse reports · accessed 2026-10-24
- 11ICANN. Advisory: compliance with DNS abuse obligations in the Registrar Accreditation Agreement and the Registry Agreement (2 May 2024) · accessed 2026-10-24
- 12ICANN. Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) · accessed 2026-10-24
- 13Hostmaster LLC. Hostmaster: the .UA domain registry · accessed 2026-10-24
- 14Cyber Police Department, National Police of Ukraine. Cyber Police: incident form and appeals · accessed 2026-10-24
- 15Cyber Police Department, National Police of Ukraine. Cyber Police: contacts · accessed 2026-10-24
- 16YouTube Help. Impersonation policy and how to report an impersonating channel · accessed 2026-10-24
- 17Telegram. Telegram FAQ: reporting and abuse · accessed 2026-10-24
- 18US Federal Trade Commission. Bringing new employees onboard? Help them avoid impersonator scams · accessed 2026-10-24
- 19Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. How CERT-UA responds to cyber incidents, from report to recovery · accessed 2026-10-24
- 20CERT-UA. Contacts: report an incident · accessed 2026-10-24